Crisis in Kenya

Until recently, Kenya was one of the hopeful stories for activist seeking to advance democracy in Africa. But now, the horrid death toll of nearly 300 people, accounts of church burnings and Kikuyus being hacked apart by angry members of other tribes evoke memories of Rwanda and Zimbabwe's rapid economic decline. The UN cited Kenyan police as saying 70, 000 people have been displaced during the five days of violence, many fleeing to neighboring Uganda and some to Tanzania. Clinics around Nairobi and Eldoret are reported to be running out of basic materials such as gauze, and many of the country's citizens remains without food and shelter. As democracy hangs by a thread in Kenya, the world helps, watches and waits.

There are many lenses through which one can examine the Kenyan crisis. For the United States, for instance, Kenya has been what the WSJ notes is a key regional ally on counter-terrorism. Instability in Kenya thus has repercussions for the entire international community. For the African continent, the crisis brings much deeper social, economic and developmental implications. For the Chinese, too, Kenya's democratic crisis hits at the heart of Beijing's strategic interests. 

Between 2004-2007 Kenya and China signed 12 bilateral accords covering a variety of fields including the economy, technology, energy, tourism, health, aviation, the press, archeology and education - many of which may be jeopardized in the face of Kenya's electoral conflict. Furthermore, the Chinese view Kenya in terms of its strategic positioning and maintain it is the best-placed entry point into Eastern and Central Africa.

Yet if Kenya is indeed as central to Chinese interests as they maintain, then at least I can't help but wonder: where are they? In some respects, the conflict in Kenya is an opportunity for Beijing to rectify its international image vis-a-vis its activity in Darfur and present itself as a defender of human rights and a source of international aid. In November 2007 China offered to help Kenya modernize its military, noting that the support would not only improve the military's ability to ensure security along the borders but also enhance Kenya's role in peace-keeping activities in Africa and beyond. It would seem that such capabilities are necessary now more than ever. 

This is not to suggest that the Chinese assume a central role in the conflict; quite the opposite. What I'm suggesting is that China has an opportunity to assist a floundering state - one which has been its diplomatic ally for over 40 years. While Beijing should stay out of Kenya's politics, it can - and should - assist the country's citizens as much as it can.

A global trek to poor nations, from poorer ones

My interest in Chinese migration led me to two articles published in the NYTimes. In the first, Thomas Fuller tells us that cheap Chinese goods are improving livelihoods worldwide. Concerns over product safety such as those prevalent in the West are essentially moot in countries such as Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam where national purchasing power is generally low, and to own a cheap television or cooking utensil is alone a luxury. 

This is true not only in Asia, but in Africa as well: cheap Chinese goods are infiltrating markets from Kenya to South Africa and Zimbabwe. While the quality of these goods is much like the price (low) and the ramifications on local industries remains somewhat dubious, there is an upside. Indeed, the influx of such goods is increasing the purchasing power of citizens all over Africa. More than that, it is connecting them to a world beyond their own. With Western and domestic products becoming increasingly too expensive, chances are high that cheap Chinese goods will continue to dominate markets across Asia and Africa - perhaps even long after citizens will be able to afford something better. 

Related to this phenomenon is a piece by Jason DeParle telling us that there are an estimated 74 million 'south-south' migrants making the trek from "poorer to poor" countries. Though his article focuses primarily on the Dominican Republic, it speaks of a much wider phenomenon - one of which contemporary Sino-African relations form a significant part. Indeed, once one looks beyond China's 'oil-for-aid' diplomacy and its pursuit of resources, the China-in-Africa phenomenon is analogous to what DeParle describes: Chinese migrants seeking jobs and better wages; some coming for seasonal work, and others putting down roots.